Hepatitis A notifications in the EU/EEA, 2010-2019: what can we learn from case reporting to the European Surveillance System?

BackgroundEuropean Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries annually report hepatitis A (HepA) notifications to The European Surveillance System (TESSy).AimTo describe EU/EEA HepA notifications from 2010 to 2019 and identify infection drivers and surveillance improvements.MethodsWe analysed demographic, clinical and transmission information of HepA confirmed cases from TESSy. We stratified countries by population susceptibility profile and performed time-series analysis to describe trends in notification rates, sex distribution and travel history.ResultsTwenty-nine EU/EEA countries reported 139,793 HepA cases. Six eastern EU countries reported > 60% of these cases. EU/EEA notification rate during the study period was 3.2 cases per 100,000 population (range 2.7-5.6). Notifications peaked in 2014 and 2017, with marked differences in case demographic characteristics. Notification trends varied across different country susceptibility groups. In 2017, the proportion of males (74%) and case median age (31 years) increased steeply, while no changes occurred in 2014. Travel history showed seasonal case peaks following the summer. More than 47,000 hospitalisations were reported. Annual case fatality was < 0.2% for all years. Information on travel history, hospitalisation, death and mode of transmission was suboptimal.DiscussionApart from some countries in its east, the EU/EEA is characterised by low HepA incidence baseline and susceptible to recurrent large cross-border outbreaks. Analysis of European surveillance data highlighted the need for stronger prevention policies for eastern EU countries, men who have sex with men and travellers. Improving surveillance data-quality will enhance knowledge on food-borne, and travel-related exposures to inform more effective and tailored regional prevention policies.

Non-pharmaceutical interventions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in 30 European countries: the ECDC-JRC Response Measures Database.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries implemented a wide set of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), sometimes with limited knowledge on their effect and impact on population. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) developed a Response Measures Database (ECDC-JRC RMD) to archive NPIs in 30 EU/EEA countries from 1 January 2020 to 30 September 2022. We aimed to introduce a tool for the wider scientific community to assess COVID-19 NPIs effect and impact in the EU/EEA. We give an overview of the ECDC-JRC RMD rationale and structure, including a brief analysis of the main NPIs applied in 2020, before the roll-out of the COVID-19 vaccination campaigns. The ECDC-JRC RMD organises NPIs through a three-level hierarchical structure and uses four additional parameters ('status', 'implementation', 'target group' and 'geographical representation') to provide further information on the implementation of each measure. Features including the ready-for-analysis, downloadable format and its agile taxonomy and structure highlight the potential of the ECDC-JRC RMD to facilitate further NPI analysis and optimise decision making on public health response policies.

Public health considerations for transitioning beyond the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic in the EU/EEA.

Many countries, including some within the EU/EEA, are in the process of transitioning from the acute pandemic phase. During this transition, it is crucial that countries' strategies and activities remain guided by clear COVID-19 control objectives, which increasingly will focus on preventing and managing severe outcomes. Therefore, attention must be given to the groups that are particularly vulnerable to severe outcomes of SARS-CoV-2 infection, including individuals in congregate and healthcare settings. In this phase of pandemic management, a strong focus must remain on transitioning testing approaches and systems for targeted surveillance of COVID-19, capitalising on and strengthening existing systems for respiratory virus surveillance. Furthermore, it will be crucial to focus on lessons learned from the pandemic to enhance preparedness and to enact robust systems for the preparedness, detection, rapid investigation and assessment of new and emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants. Filling existing knowledge gaps, including behavioural insights, can help guide the response to future resurgences of SARS-CoV-2 and/or the emergence of other pandemics. Finally, 'vaccine agility' will be needed to respond to changes in people's behaviours, changes in the virus, and changes in population immunity, all the while addressing issues of global health equity.

Severity of the clinical presentation of hepatitis A in five European countries from 1995 to 2014.

OBJECTIVES: We analysed hepatitis A (HepA) notifications and hospitalisations in Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden for available periods between 1995 and 2014. We aimed to investigate whether decreasing HepA incidence is associated with increasing age at infection and worsening HepA presentation and to identify groups at risk of severe disease. METHODS: We performed a retrospective cohort study including 36 734 notified and 36 849 hospitalised patients. We used negative binomial regressions to identify over time: i) trends in hospitalisation and notification rates; ii) proportion of hospitalised and notified patients aged ≥40 years; iii) proportion of "severe hospitalisations"; and iv) risk factors for severe hospitalisation. RESULTS: During the study period both HepA notifications and hospitalisations decreased, with notification rates decreasing faster, patients aged ≥40 years increased, however, the proportion of severe HepA hospitalisations remained stable. Older patients and patients with comorbidities, particularly liver diseases, were more likely to experience severe disease. CONCLUSIONS: We used digitalised health information to confirm decreasing trends in HepA hospitalisations and notifications, and the increasing age of patients with HepA in Europe. We did not identify an increase in the severity of the clinical presentation of patients with HepA. Older patients with liver diseases are at increased risk of severe disease and should be prioritised for vaccination.

Salmonellosis outbreak with novel Salmonella enterica subspecies enterica serotype (11:z41:e,n,z15) attributable to sesame products in five European countries, 2016 to 2017.

In spring 2016, Greece reported an outbreak caused by a previously undescribed Salmonella enterica subsp. enterica serotype (antigenic formula 11:z41:e,n,z15) via the Epidemic Intelligence Information System for Food- and Waterborne Diseases and Zoonoses (EPIS-FWD), with epidemiological evidence for sesame products as presumptive vehicle. Subsequently, Germany, Czech Republic, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom (UK) reported infections with this novel serotype via EPIS-FWD. Concerned countries in collaboration with the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) adopted a common outbreak case definition. An outbreak case was defined as a laboratory-confirmed notification of the novel Salmonella serotype. Between March 2016 and April 2017, 47 outbreak cases were notified (Greece: n = 22; Germany: n = 13; Czech Republic: n = 5; Luxembourg: n = 4; UK: n = 3). Whole genome sequencing revealed the very close genetic relatedness of isolates from all affected countries. Interviews focusing on sesame product consumption, suspicious food item testing and trace-back analysis following Salmonella spp. detection in food products identified a company in Greece where sesame seeds from different countries were processed. Through European collaboration, it was possible to identify and recall sesame spread as one contaminated food item serving as vehicle of infection and trace it back to its origin.

Improving preparedness to respond to cross-border hepatitis A outbreaks in the European Union/European Economic Area: towards comparable sequencing of hepatitis A virus.

IntroductionSequence-based typing of hepatitis A virus (HAV) is important for outbreak detection, investigation and surveillance. In 2013, sequencing was central to resolving a large European Union (EU)-wide outbreak related to frozen berries. However, as the sequenced HAV genome regions were only partly comparable between countries, results were not always conclusive.AimThe objective was to gather information on HAV surveillance and sequencing in EU/European Economic Area (EEA) countries to find ways to harmonise their procedures, for improvement of cross-border outbreak responses.MethodsIn 2014, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) conducted a survey on HAV surveillance practices in EU/EEA countries. The survey enquired whether a referral system for confirming primary diagnostics of hepatitis A existed as well as a central collection/storage of hepatitis A cases' samples for typing. Questions on HAV sequencing procedures were also asked. Based on the results, an expert consultation proposed harmonised procedures for cross-border outbreak response, in particular regarding sequencing. In 2016, a follow-up survey assessed uptake of suggested methods.ResultsOf 31 EU/EEA countries, 23 (2014) and 27 (2016) participated. Numbers of countries with central collection and storage of HAV positive samples and of those performing sequencing increased from 12 to 15 and 12 to 14 respectively in 2016, with all countries typing an overlapping fragment of 218 nt. However, variation existed in the sequenced genomic regions and their lengths.ConclusionsWhile HAV sequences in EU/EEA countries are comparable for surveillance, collaboration in sharing and comparing these can be further strengthened.

An international outbreak of Salmonella enterica serotype Enteritidis linked to eggs from Poland: a microbiological and epidemiological study.

BACKGROUND: Salmonella spp are a major cause of food-borne outbreaks in Europe. We investigated a large multi-country outbreak of Salmonella enterica serotype Enteritidis in the EU and European Economic Area (EEA). METHODS: A confirmed case was defined as a laboratory-confirmed infection with the outbreak strains of S Enteritidis based on whole-genome sequencing (WGS), occurring between May 1, 2015, and Oct 31, 2018. A probable case was defined as laboratory-confirmed infection with S Enteritidis with the multiple-locus variable-number tandem repeat analysis outbreak profile. Multi-country epidemiological, trace-back, trace-forward, and environmental investigations were done. We did a case-control study including confirmed and probable cases and controls randomly sampled from the population registry (frequency matched by age, sex, and postal code). Odds ratios (ORs) for exposure rates between cases and controls were calculated with unmatched univariable and multivariable logistic regression. FINDINGS: 18 EU and EEA countries reported 838 confirmed and 371 probable cases. 509 (42%) cases were reported in 2016, after which the number of cases steadily increased. The case-control study results showed that cases more often ate in food establishments than did controls (OR 3·4 [95% CI 1·6-7·3]), but no specific food item was identified. Recipe-based food trace-back investigations among cases who ate in food establishments identified eggs from Poland as the vehicle of infection in October, 2016. Phylogenetic analysis identified two strains of S Enteritidis in human cases that were subsequently identified in salmonella-positive eggs and primary production premises in Poland, confirming the source of the outbreak. After control measures were implemented, the number of cases decreased, but increased again in March, 2017, and the increase continued into 2018. INTERPRETATION: This outbreak highlights the public health value of multi-country sharing of epidemiological, trace-back, and microbiological data. The re-emergence of cases suggests that outbreak strains have continued to enter the food chain, although changes in strain population dynamics and fewer cases indicate that control measures had some effect. Routine use of WGS in salmonella surveillance and outbreak response promises to identify and stop outbreaks in the future. FUNDING: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; Directorate General for Health and Food Safety, European Commission; and National Public Health and Food Safety Institutes of the authors' countries (see Acknowledgments for full list).

Hepatitis A outbreak disproportionately affecting men who have sex with men (MSM) in the European Union and European Economic Area, June 2016 to May 2017.

Between 1 June 2016 and 31 May 2017, 17 European Union (EU) and European Economic Area countries reported 4,096 cases associated with a multi-country hepatitis A (HA) outbreak. Molecular analysis identified three co-circulating hepatitis A virus (HAV) strains of genotype IA: VRD_521_2016, V16-25801 and RIVM-HAV16-090. We categorised cases as confirmed, probable or possible, according to the EU outbreak case definitions. Confirmed cases were infected with one of the three outbreak strains. We investigated case characteristics and strain-specific risk factors for transmission. A total of 1,400 (34%) cases were confirmed; VRD_521_2016 and RIVM-HAV16-090 accounted for 92% of these. Among confirmed cases with available epidemiological data, 92% (361/393) were unvaccinated, 43% (83/195) travelled to Spain during the incubation period and 84% (565/676) identified as men who have sex with men (MSM). Results depict an HA outbreak of multiple HAV strains, within a cross-European population, that was particularly driven by transmission between non-immune MSM engaging in high-risk sexual behaviour. The most effective preventive measure to curb this outbreak is HAV vaccination of MSM, supplemented by primary prevention campaigns that target the MSM population and promote protective sexual behaviour.

Travel-associated hepatitis A in Europe, 2009 to 2015.

BackgroundTravel to countries with high or intermediate hepatitis A virus (HAV) endemicity is a risk factor for infection in residents of countries with low HAV endemicity. Aim: The objective of this study was to estimate the risk for hepatitis A among European travellers using surveillance and travel denominator data. Methods: We retrieved hepatitis A surveillance data from 13 European Union (EU)/ European Economic Area (EEA) countries with comprehensive surveillance systems and travel denominator data from the Statistical Office of the European Union. A travel-associated case of hepatitis A was defined as any case reported as imported. Results: From 2009 to 2015, the 13 countries reported 18,839 confirmed cases of hepatitis A, of which 5,233 (27.8%) were travel-associated. Of these, 39.8% were among children younger than 15 years. The overall risk associated with travel abroad decreased over the period at an annual rate of 3.7% (95% confidence interval (CI): 0.7-2.7) from 0.70 cases per million nights in 2009 to 0.51 in 2015. The highest risk was observed in travellers to Africa (2.11 cases per million nights). Cases more likely to be reported as travel-associated were male and of younger age (< 25 years). Conclusion: Travel is still a major risk factor for HAV infection in the EU/EEA, although the risk of infection may have slightly decreased in recent years. Children younger than 15 years accounted for a large proportion of cases and should be prioritised for vaccination.

Field investigation with real-time virus genetic characterisation support of a cluster of Ebola virus disease cases in Dubréka, Guinea, April to June 2015.

On 11 May 2015, the Dubréka prefecture, Guinea, reported nine laboratory-confirmed cases of Ebola virus disease (EVD). None could be epidemiologically linked to cases previously reported in the prefecture. We describe the epidemiological and molecular investigations of this event. We used the Dubréka EVD registers and the Ebola treatment centre's (ETC) records to characterise chains of transmission. Real-time field Ebola virus sequencing was employed to support epidemiological results. An epidemiological cluster of 32 cases was found, of which 27 were laboratory confirmed, 24 were isolated and 20 died. Real-time viral sequencing on 12 cases demonstrated SL3 lineage viruses with sequences differing by one to three nt inside a single phylogenetic cluster. For isolated cases, the average time between symptom onset and ETC referral was 2.8 days (interquartile range (IQR): 1-4). The average time between sample collection and molecular results' availability was 3 days (IQR: 2-5). In an area with scarce resources, the genetic characterisation supported the outbreak investigations in real time, linking cases where epidemiological investigation was limited and reassuring that the responsible strain was already circulating in Guinea. We recommend coupling thorough epidemiological and genomic investigations to control EVD clusters.

The European Medical Corps: first Public Health Team mission and future perspectives.

The 2013-2016 Ebola epidemic in West Africa challenged traditional international mechanisms for public health team mobilisation to control outbreaks. Consequently, in February 2016, the European Union (EU) launched the European Medical Corps (EMC), a mechanism developed in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO) to rapidly deploy teams and equipment in response to public health emergencies inside and outside the EU. Public Health Teams (PHTs), a component of the EMC, consist of experts in communicable disease prevention and control from participating countries and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), to support affected countries and WHO in risk assessment and outbreak response. The European Commission's Directorate-General European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations and Directorate-General Health and Food Safety, and ECDC, plan and support deployments. The first EMC-PHT deployment took place in May 2016, with a team sent to Angola for a yellow fever outbreak. The aims were to evaluate transmission risks to local populations and EU citizens in Angola, the risk of regional spread and importation into the EU, and to advise Angolan and EU authorities on control measures. International actors should gain awareness of the EMC, its response capacities and the means for requesting assistance.

Seroprevalence and susceptibility to hepatitis A in the European Union and European Economic Area: a systematic review.

Most of the European Union (EU) and European Economic Area (EEA) is considered a region of very low hepatitis A virus (HAV) endemicity; however, geographical differences exist. We did a systematic review with the aim of describing seroprevalence and susceptibility in the general population or special groups in the EU and EEA. We searched databases and public health national institutes websites for HAV seroprevalence records published between Jan 1, 1975, and June 30, 2014, with no language restrictions. An updated search was done on Aug 10, 2016. We defined seroprevalence profiles (very low, low, and intermediate) as the proportion of the population with age-specific anti-HAV antibodies at age 15 and 30 years, and susceptibility profiles (low, moderate, high, and very high) as the proportion of susceptible individuals at age 30 and 50 years. We included 228 studies from 28 of 31 EU and EEA countries. For the period 2000-14, 24 countries had a very low seroprevalence profile, compared with five in 1975-89. The susceptibility among adults ranged between low and very high and had a geographical gradient, with three countries in the low susceptibility category. Since 1975, EU and EEA countries have shown decreasing seropositivity; however, considerable regional variability exists. The main limitations of this study are that the studies retrieved for analysis might not be representative of all EU and EEA publications about HAV and might have poor national representativeness. A large proportion of EU and EEA residents are now susceptible to HAV infection. Our Review supports the need to reconsider specific prevention and control measures, to further decrease HAV circulation while providing protection against the infection in the EU and EEA, and could be used to inform susceptible travellers visiting EU and EEA countries with different HAV endemicity levels.

Multinational outbreak of travel-related Salmonella Chester infections in Europe, summers 2014 and 2015.

Between 2014 and 2015, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control was informed of an increase in numbers of Salmonella enterica serotype Chester cases with travel to Morocco occurring in six European countries. Epidemiological and microbiological investigations were conducted. In addition to gathering information on the characteristics of cases from the different countries in 2014, the epidemiological investigation comprised a matched case-case study involving French patients with salmonellosis who travelled to Morocco that year. A univariate conditional logistic regression was performed to quantify associations. The microbiological study included a whole genome sequencing (WGS) analysis of clinical and non-human isolates of S. Chester of varied place and year of isolation. A total of 162 cases, mostly from France, followed by Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark and Sweden were reported, including 86 (53%) women. The median age per country ranged from 3 to 38 years. Cases of S. Chester were more likely to have eaten in a restaurant and visited the coast of Morocco. The results of WGS showed five multilocus sequence types (ST), with 96 of 153 isolates analysed clustering into a tight group that corresponded to a novel ST, ST1954. Of these 96 isolates, 46 (48%) were derived from food or patients returning from Morocco and carried two types of plasmids containing either qnrS1 or qnrB19 genes. This European-wide outbreak associated with travel to Morocco was likely a multi-source outbreak with several food vehicles contaminated by multidrug-resistant S. Chester strains.

Hepatitis E virus: Assessment of the epidemiological situation in humans in Europe, 2014/15.

BACKGROUND: Hepatitis E virus (HEV) is endemic in EU/EEA countries, but the understanding of the burden of the infection in humans is inconsistent as the disease is not under EU surveillance but subject to national policies. STUDY: Countries were asked to nominate experts and to complete a standardised questionnaire about the epidemiological situation and surveillance of HEV in their respective EU/EEA country. This study reviewed surveillance systems for human cases of HEV in EU/EEA countries and nominated experts assessed the epidemiology in particular examining the recent increase in the number of autochthonous cases. RESULTS: Surveillance systems and case definitions across EU/EEA countries were shown to be highly variable and testing algorithms were unreliable. Large increases of autochthonous cases were reported from Western EU/EEA countries with lower case numbers seen in Northern and Southern European countries. Lack of clinical awareness and variability in testing strategies might account for the observed differences in hepatitis E incidence across EU/EEA countries. Infections were predominantly caused by HEV genotype 3, the most prevalent virus type in the animal reservoirs. CONCLUSION: Discussions from the expert group supported joint working across countries to better monitor the epidemiology and possible changes in risk of virus acquisition at a European level. There was agreement to share surveillance strategies and algorithms but also importantly the collation of HEV data from human and animal populations. These data collected at a European level would serve the 'One Health' approach to better informing on human exposure to HEV.

Outcomes analysis of new entrant screening for active tuberculosis in Heathrow and Gatwick airports, United Kingdom 2009/2010.

BACKGROUND: In 2012, the United Kingdom (UK) Government announced that the new entrant screening for active tuberculosis (TB) in Heathrow and Gatwick airports would end. Our study objective was to estimate screening yield and diagnostic accuracy, and identify those at risk of active TB after entry. METHODS: We designed a retrospective cohort study and linked new entrants screened from June 2009 to September 2010 through probabilistic matching with UK Enhanced TB Surveillance (ETS) data (June 2009 to December 2010). Yield was the proportion of cases reported to ETS within three months of airport screening in the screened population. To estimate screening diagnostic accuracy we assessed sensitivity, specificity, positive and negative predictive values. Through Poisson regression we identified groups at increased risk of TB diagnosis after entry. RESULTS: We identified 200,199 screened entrants, of these 59 had suspected TB at screening and were reported within 3 months to ETS (yield = 0.03 %). Sensitivity was 26 %; specificity was 99.7 %; positive predictive value was 13.2 %; negative predictive value was 99.9 %. Overall, 350 entrants were reported in ETS. Persons from countries with annual TB incidence higher than 150 cases per 100,000 population and refugees and asylum seekers were at increased risk of TB diagnosis after entry (population attributable risk 77 and 3 % respectively). CONCLUSION: Airport screening has very low screening yields, sensitivity and positive predictive value. New entrants coming from countries with annual TB incidence higher than 150 per 100,000 population, refugees and asylum seekers should be prioritised at pre- or post-entry screening.

Early findings in outbreak of haemolytic uraemic syndrome among young children caused by Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli, Romania, January to February 2016.

As at 29 February 2016, 15 cases of haemolytic uraemic syndrome with onset between 25 January and 22 February were reported among children between five and 38 months in Romania, and three of them died. Cases were mostly from southern Romania. Six cases tested positive for Escherichia coli O26 by serology. Fruits, vegetables, meat and dairy products were among the possible common food exposures. Investigations are ongoing in Romania to control the outbreak.

Real-time, portable genome sequencing for Ebola surveillance.

The Ebola virus disease epidemic in West Africa is the largest on record, responsible for over 28,599 cases and more than 11,299 deaths. Genome sequencing in viral outbreaks is desirable to characterize the infectious agent and determine its evolutionary rate. Genome sequencing also allows the identification of signatures of host adaptation, identification and monitoring of diagnostic targets, and characterization of responses to vaccines and treatments. The Ebola virus (EBOV) genome substitution rate in the Makona strain has been estimated at between 0.87 × 10(-3) and 1.42 × 10(-3) mutations per site per year. This is equivalent to 16-27 mutations in each genome, meaning that sequences diverge rapidly enough to identify distinct sub-lineages during a prolonged epidemic. Genome sequencing provides a high-resolution view of pathogen evolution and is increasingly sought after for outbreak surveillance. Sequence data may be used to guide control measures, but only if the results are generated quickly enough to inform interventions. Genomic surveillance during the epidemic has been sporadic owing to a lack of local sequencing capacity coupled with practical difficulties transporting samples to remote sequencing facilities. To address this problem, here we devise a genomic surveillance system that utilizes a novel nanopore DNA sequencing instrument. In April 2015 this system was transported in standard airline luggage to Guinea and used for real-time genomic surveillance of the ongoing epidemic. We present sequence data and analysis of 142 EBOV samples collected during the period March to October 2015. We were able to generate results less than 24 h after receiving an Ebola-positive sample, with the sequencing process taking as little as 15-60 min. We show that real-time genomic surveillance is possible in resource-limited settings and can be established rapidly to monitor outbreaks.